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ABSTRACT
The Mexicali Valley in Baja California is an agricultural
region adjacent to the Imperial Valley of California. Large
scale production of vegetables for export is a recently new
development in the Mexicali Valley and in my research I found
that Imperial Valley agriibusiness firms are responsible for
financing many of these operations. For the most part,
production of specialty vegetables in Mexicali reflect a
decrease in the production of those same crops in the Imperial
Valley. It is believed that the growth of the export vegetable
sector in the Mexicali Valley results from a transference of
Imperial Valley vegetable operations.
The type of production occuring in the Mexicali Valley is one
that specializes in the cultivation and packaging of speciality
vegetables like asparagus, green onions, radishes and garlic.
While these products have a domestic market, almost 90% of
Mexicali Valley production is exported to the U.S. Distribution
and marketing are mainly conducted through Imperial Valley
agents under production contracts and to a lesser degree, are
sold by U.S. production partners.
The structure of vegetable production for export in the
Mexicali Valley is skewed towards labor intensive phases such
as primary production and packaging. These are phases of least
value added and therefore, less surplus extraction. Development
appears to function as an appendage to the wider vegetable
commodity systems of the Imperial Valley. Unequal development
refers to the one-sided development of Mexicali export vegetable
production when compared to the more extensive system in the
Imperial Valley.
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1CHAPTER ONE: A CASE OF UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT ALONG THE
MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER
*Introduction
The border region of the Mexicali Valley in Baja
California, Mexico, and Imperial Valley, California, is truly
an example of the marvels achieved through modern agricultural
technology. An arid desert basin before 1901, the region is
today a major producer of cotton, grains, vegetables, fruits,
and beef. Extensive irrigation canals feed water from the
Colorado River into the two Valleys via the Alamo and American
Canals, making agricultural production possible year-round.
From the air, the region appears as an oasis of green
patchwork amidst the surrounding desert, sand dunes, and
barren mountain ranges.
Not so noticeable from above, however, is the international
boundary in the form of a chain link fence which
geographically delineates two unequal agricultural structures.
In Mexicali, agriculture is characterized by small owner
operated farms and specialized production of export crops
that, with the exception of cotton, have weak links with other
domestic industries. In the Imperial Valley, the majority of
the arable land is owned by twelve agribusiness firms
simultaneously engaged in the production or marketing of
several crops and industrial activities (i.e., processing).'
1 The term agribusiness refers to corporate-style production
and marketing enterprises developed around the international market
for agricultural goods. Ray Goldberg, Agribusiness Management for
Developing Countries, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Press, 1974.
2When compared to Mexicali, Imperial Valley agriculture has
far more extensively developed commodity systems, is more
mechanized, pays higher wages, and shows a greater tendency to
innovate and adapt new technology. 2 The development of such
unequal structures is explained by the dependent role Mexicali
agriculture plays (and has played historically) with respect
to Imperial Valley agribusiness firms.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the process of
unequal development as it stems from dependency, using the
agricultural sector of the Mexicali Valley as a case study.
This case is interesting because the agricultural sector of
Mexicali has traversed three phases of agricultural
development, each exhibiting dependent relations with Imperial
Valley agribusiness. The consequences of dependent
2 A commodity system encompasses " . .all the participants in
the production, processing, marketing of single farm product,
including farm suppliers, farmers, storage operators, processors,
wholesalers, and retailers involved in a commodity flow from
initial inputs to final consumer." - Ray A. Goldberg, Agribusiness
Management for Developing Countries, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger
Press, 1974.
3 The generally accepted theory of dependency is offered by
Theotonio Dos Santos: By dependence we mean a situation in which
the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development
and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected.
The relation between these and world trade, assumes the form of
dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and
be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can
do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have
either a positive or negative effect on their immediate develoment.
- Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence", American Economic
Review, 1970.
3development have been distinct in each phase.
This case study focuses on the most current phase of
agricultural development, the growth of the specialty
vegetable sector in the Mexicali Valley. With this example,
my investigation illustrates how the pattern of development in
export vegetable production is responsive to U.S. demand and
is in fact, a specialized appendage to the wider and more
complete vegetable commodity system in the Imperial Valley.
The dependent link of Mexicali vegetable producers to an
external market system precludes their own autonomous
expansion in the Mexicali Valley except as deemed functional
to the U.S. vegetable sector. In its segregated role as a
primary producer, vegetable export production looses the
multiplier effects that export growth is believed to produce
on the rest of the economy'.
My findings from the developmental history of agriculture
in the Mexicali Valley reveal that the region was initially
formed as an outwardly oriented economy specialized in primary
production. In the case of export vegetable production, the
reproduction of development in this direction, is related to
U.S. dominance either through direct control of the means of
production (land rental or bi-national partnerships) or
4 Expansion in primary production is believed to generate a
demand for linked residentiary activities and consequent rounds of
activity arising from increased demand for local consumer and
public goods and services (North 1955, Richardson 1969 and Ladman
1975).
4indirectly through the use of financial resources (mainly
credit).
I found that Mexicali's emphasis on vegetable production
for export has been accompanied by an increase of vegetable
imports. This supports the conclusion that export orientation
in the production of vegetables stunts the production of
vegetables for local consumption, forcing consumers to import
these goods as higher U.S. prices. For the Mexicali Valley,
in addition to rising costs for consumers, the labor intensive
nature of the vegetable sector puts pressure on producers of
crops consumed in Mexicali by raising labor costs. Because
cultivation of specialty vegetables for export is a more
lucrative endeavor, domestic multi-producer groups and U.S.-
backed growers can afford to pay double the average minimum
wage paid by other sectors ($8/day compared to $3.75/day - in
U.S. dollars).
Rising production costs create a profit squeeze on smaller
producers and producers of less valuable crops, because they
are forced to raise their wages (since increasing production
is not a viable option given land and water restrictions) in
order to compete for labor. Many are forced to rent their
lands or resort to family labor. In the case of "ejido"
lands, renting or leasing is illegal but occurs never the
5less.'
For the Mexicali Valley, an emphasis on export production
that neglects development of Mexicali consumed goods,
intensifies an unstable relationship of dependency on external
markets. The external markets for specialty vegetables are
especially subject to erratic fluctuations because of the high
degree of perishability and large transport costs associated
with such produce.
Balanced growth cannot occur because when a certain market
fails there is no parallel internal market to support affected
growers which also fail and are not necessarily replaced by
new ones. Furthermore, U.S. capital is invested in a manner
which exploits Mexicali's low wages rather than diversifying
and strengthening its economy. 6 The Mexicali case thus serves
as an excellent example of a risky market which can falter if
consumer preferences in the U.S. change or other third world
countries can produce specialty vegetables more cheaply.
METHODOLOGY
The traditional means for evaluating economic development
in a region is through an interpretation of empirical research
which quantifies economic activity. Such a method when
5 Ejidos are agrarian communities where access to land is
regulated by the Mexican federal government. Each accepted member
is given some amount of land but it is not necessarily communal and
agricultural work does not have to be cooperative.
6 Although wages are higher in specialty vegetable production
than in other agricultural sectors, they still represent only 14%
of Imperial Valley agricultural wages for unskilled laborers.
6applied uniformly, is useful in providing a standard for
comparing development over time and across regions. This
investigation reviews indicators of Mexicali's economic
productiveness such as levels of gross domestic product (GDP),
employment, and income, to establish how the status of the
Mexicali Valley is viewed in conventional terms.
According to these indicators the agricultural sector of
the Mexicali Valley ranks as a leading agricultural producer
over other regions in Mexico. In addition, these indicators
reflect levels of achievement comparable to those in the
Imperial Valley. Agricultural yields and the value of land
are similar to those of the Imperial Valley presumably,
because they share the same geological conditions but also,
because both Valleys have advanced agricultural infastructures
that enable a similar utilization of land.
The semblance of parallel achievement, however, is one
based mainly on increasing product per worker and the leading
positions both Valleys hold in their respective national
agricultural economies. Using only economic indicators to
evaluate Mexicali's economic performance could be misleading
because they do not reveal the underlying imbalance in the
structure of production. For purposes of identifying
characteristics of unequal development in the Mexican-U.S.
border region, conventional indicators do not provide
sufficient criteria.
Unequal development is a dynamic process involving factors
7that are not necessarily quantifiable. An account of the
historical development of the region and its relationship with
U.S. capital would more adequately depict unequal conditions
as well as, reveal their sources. Therefore, in addition to
conventional empirical methods, this investigation explores
the history of Mexicali's growth detailing the characteristics
of the key phases of agricultural development.
CHAPTER SUMMARIES
Chapter two is an evaluation of the economic status of the
overall Mexicali Valley economy with a particular focus on
where the performance of the agricultural sector fits in. The
mode of analysis is based on traditional economic indicators
of gross domestic product, population growth, employment, and
income. This chapter serves as a benchmark for reviewing the
development of the export vegetable sector.
Chapter three describes the historical development of the
region for the purpose of establishing an account of how the
conditions leading to unequal development were formed.
Attention is paid to the three phases of agricultural
development that characterize or were responsible for changes
in the economic structure of that sector.
Chapter four presents the example of the Mexicali Valley
export vegetable sector. The first part focuses on
statistical indicators which illustrate the performance of
this sector in comparison with other agricultural sectors in
8Mexicali. The following sections describe the production
structure and its relationship to U.S. agribusiness firms in
the Imperial Valley of California.
Data and other information for this chapter are based on
agricultural production reports, research on export vegetable
production currently being conducted by Mexicali researchers,
and findings from field interviews.
The conclusion chapter presents the final assessment of the
case findings and points out additional work necessary for
further evaluation.
9CHAPTER TWO: THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE MEXICALI VALLEY
IN THE 1980s
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of
Mexicali's current economic state as viewed in conventional
terms and to establish where the performance of the
agricultural sector fits within this framework. A more
detailed review of the economic indicators for the Mexicali
Valley appears in Appendix A. This chapter also serves as a
benchmark for reviewing the development of the export
vegetable sector in Mexicali, which is the topic of Chapter
Three.
A. Demographic Brief
The Mexicali Valley is incorporated in the county of
Mexicali and is part of a geographically contiguous region
with the Imperial County of California, although the two are
separated by a chain link fence that forms the international
boundary between Mexico and the U.S. (Figure II-1). It is the
second largest county in the state of Baja California with
approximately 11650 sqare kilometers in area and houses the
largest population in the state.
With 649,707 people in 1987, the Mexicali Valley has 43% of
the state's inhabitants and an average density of 55.7 people
per square kilometer. The area is highly urbanized with 81%
of the Valley residents living in the city of Mexicali which
is also the state capital.
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B. General Survey of the Regional Economic Conditions
Using the concept of regional and sectoral GDP for the
Mexicali Valley, (namely, the value of total production within
the region regardless of whether income accrues to foreign or
domestic factors of production), it is apparent that the area
is experiencing economic growth on a commendable scale.
Regional and per capita GDP has increased steadily over the
past 17 years (1970 - 1987); keeping abreast rapid population
growth. GDP growth in the Mexicali Valley for the period
between 1970-1987, surpasses that of Baja California and of
the entire nation.
Agricultural GDP for the Mexicali Valley climbs steadily in
relation to state and national proportions but declines in
comparison to the rest of the regional industries. Never the
less, taking the declining agricultural workforce into
account, Mexicali's agricultural GDP denotes increases in
worker productivity.
In the area of employment, the majority of Mexicali's labor
force is under 25 years of age. Employment is greatest in the
service industry and is followed by agriculture, retail trade,
and manufacturing. Roughly 40% of the workforce is employed
full-time (48 hour work week) while another 42% work 40 hours
or less. The official unemployment rate is relatively low
compared to other regions in Mexico but this figure is
believed to be underestimated.
The underemployment figure based on full-time equivalents,
12
stands at approximately 26% of the economically active
population. In view of the high per capita GDP in the region,
however, one could argue that voluntary part-time employment
is the case. In the agricultural sector, underemployment is
most likely due to the seasonal nature of production in which
case, less than full-time employment would be the norm rather
than the exception. Any other explanations for such a high
underemployment rate would be similarly speculative.
Wages in the Mexicali Valley tend to exceed the general
minimum wage set by the federal government despite the high
underemployment rate. A possible explanation for this
condition may be that over all, workers tend to be more
skilled in the Mexicali Valley. The Mexicali Valley is highly
urbanized and federal minimum wages for professional and semi-
skilled occupations found mainly in urban centers, offer up to
one and a half times more than the general minimum wage.
Under conditions of full-time employment, the average
minimum salary for 1980 was 4,320.00 pesos (roughly $186.00
U.S. currency). Excluding the group who did not specify their
income, 44% of the economically active population earned this
minimum or below at the time of the 1980 Census. 56% of the
population earned above this minimum although only 12% of the
economically active reported having worked over 48 hours
during the week of the census. This reinforces the opinion
that people in the Mexicali Valley earn higher wages because
they have greater skills.
13
On the surface, the economy of the Mexicali Valley appears
well balanced and certainly not unequal, in comparison to
other regions in Mexico. However, this is a region that is
oriented towards the U.S. economy and therefore based more on
the U.S. dollar than the Mexican peso. In these terms, the
balance is not so clear. The following chapter describes the
development of the Mexicali economic structure and its
relations with the U.S. An account of how Mexicali's economic
structure is organized and how it has changed over time,
provides a clearer picture of what is meant by unequal
development.
14
CHAPTER THREE: CREATION OF THE CONDITIONS FOR UNEQUAL
DEVELOPMENT
This chapter presents a historical account of the formation
of conditions that led to unequal development in the Mexicali
Valley. Discussion centers around the three phases of
agricultural development and key events that are responsible
for its structural characteristics. Each phase is
distinguished by the unique links formed with foreign capital.
Historical Development of the Region
The economy of the Mexicali Valley is of recent origin when
compared to other regions of Mexico. The geographic isolation
of this area from the interior markets of Mexico and the
scarcity of an indigenous population, expedited foreign
colonization and facilitated their control over the regional
development process. As a consequence, the resulting economic
structure was one which was oriented towards the external
markets of the United States rather than the central markets
of Mexico. Outward orientation becomes a facet of the economy
that has important repercussions later in the Mexicali
Valley's development process.
A. Phase I (1900 - 1934): Internationalization of Capital
The first phase of Mexicali's agricultural development was
characterized by monopoly capitalist expansion. A single
15
transnational corporation owned over 90% of the land and at
one point, controlled 80% employment in the Mexicali Valley.
An arrangement of sharecroppers were geared towards the
monocultivation of cotton for export.
Foreign control over credit sources, land, water rights and
agro-industrial employment (i.e., cotton gins) impeded the
development of industry which was linked with the interior
markets of Mexico. Foreign capitalists were soley interested
in developing the export market. The structure of Mexicali's
agricultural economy was established for the express purpose
of specializing in cotton production.
*Colonization of the Mexicali Valley Territory
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which ended the Mexican-
American War in 1848, ceded California and Arizona among other
territories to the U.S. and brought streams of American
frontiersmen through the border region on their way to the
northern California gold mines. Venture capitalists traveling
through the area, soon realized the agricultural potential of
the ancient deposit of alluvial soils found in the once,
Colorado River basin, now the Mexicali and Imperial Valleys.
American entrepreneurs bought up land in the Imperial
Valley on the U.S. side and petitioned the U.S. government for
assistance in constructing a canal for diverting water from
the Colorado River. With the prospect of irrigation water
coming into the area, a U.S. investment group associated with
16
the Anderson-Clayton Company, recognized the value of the
Mexican portion of the region and purchased over 800,000 acres
of the Mexicali Valley from the Mexican consul in San
Francisco, Guillermo Andrade (Whiteford 198 and Ladman 1975).
These investors, under the auspices of the Colorado River Land
Company (CRLC), were able to acquire rights to develop the
land given the prevailing industrialization goals of the
Porfirio Diaz era.
Banking on an economic base in agricultural production
for export, this Mexican dictator opened the doors to foreign
capital in an effort to finance the modernization of the
nation. The colonization and development of the Mexicali
Valley into an agricultural region, fit well into the federal
scheme of the times and this period marked the start of
Mexicali's links with U.S. capital. It also began a phase of
intensive internationalization of capital. Major portions of
Mexico's productive capital was owned by foreign investors and
as a consequence they controlled the production surpluses as
well. Never the less, the Diaz regime was eager to populate
and develop the border region's potential and gladly extended
ownership opportunities to the desert settlers.
*Internationalization of Capital
The U.S. government ultimately denied the request of
Imperial Valley landowners to divert Colorado River waters
because of its navigational attributes. In 1893, an American
17
firm, the Colorado River Irrigation Company (now the Colorado
Development Company), decided to utilize an old river bed of
the once, Alamo River on the Mexican side to construct the
canal thereby, eluding U.S. authority. With Andrade as a
Mexican partner, the firm established distributive and
regulatory irrigation agencies on both sides of the border.
The Alamo Canal was completed in 1901 and shortly after,
the Mexican government formally upheld CDC's license to the
canal waters under the condition that Mexico receive half of
the quantity which flows through the waterway (Whiteford
1986). Under the jurisdiction of the Mexican Compania de
Terreno Y Aguas de Baja California, fees were charged for the
use of water in the Mexicali Valley. The introduction of a
steady water supply permited the CRLC to begin agricultural
development of its lands.
The first decade marked a period of infrastructure
development as tenants of CRLC's land constructed irrigation
canals and roads while members of the CRLC's investment group
established a cotton gin, a seed company, and a bank (Ladman
1975). The city of Mexicali was established in 1903 as a
center for agricultural services and trade. A railroad line
to the Yuma, Arizona, and Tijuana/San Diego areas was
constructed in 1904 which facilitated the export of
agricultural goods and the further colonization of the area.
Also in 1904, the CRLC obtained Andrade's partnership in
the Compania de Terrenos Y Aguas. With control over land and
18
water resources, the CRLC dedicated itself to the exclusive
production of cotton and cattle ranching utilizing a system of
sharecropping to develop their holdings. By providing credit
to its growers and purchasing all of their cotton, the CRLC
gained control over labor and product markets, effectively
shutting out other major competitors. The CRLC's monopoly
over land, labor and water, its ability to provide credit, and
its freedom from state regulation, enabled it to uphold a 30
year reign over the economy of the border region.
In this initial period of building the fundamental market
structures for capitalist accumulation, all of the major
productive forces were under foreign control. Even the bulk
of Mexicali's colonists were foreigners (Chinese, Japanese and
Hindu laborers) since the lack of indigenous farmers
necessitated that the CRLC import its own cheap labor into the
region. Later on, this domination by foreign capital became a
source of tension when Mexican nationals began coming into the
area only to discover that the CRLC's monopolistic hold,
prevented entry into the region's economy except as a laborer
or sharecropper.
*Monocultivation of Cotton
The onset of World War I spured demand for cotton and drove
up its world price. In the Mexicali Valley, cultivation of
cotton jumped from 12 hectares in 1912 to 12,800 hectares two
years later (Ladman 1975). Production increased steadily up
19
to 1920 after which it stabilized for the next ten years
ranging between 34,000 to 64,000 hectares.
The CRLC was able to establish the exclusive cultivation of
cotton by its sharecroppers through the provision of credit
which stipulated its production. All of CRLC sharecropper's
cotton was purchased and exported by the company. As a
result, the region's transportation network was forged with an
orientation towards the U.S. Fueled by strong demand for
cotton on the world market, more land was brought under
irrigation and further infrastructure expansion occured. The
new employment this created in turn spurred migration of
Mexican nationals into the region although at this time, they
were still out-numbered by Chinese immigrants.
Growth continued unhindered throughout the period of the
Mexican Revolution (1910-1917) mainly because of the region's
geographic isolation. Distance not only placed the Mexicali
Valley out of reach from the violence of internal struggles in
central Mexico, but CRLC's effective autonomy from political
regulation, allowed for the regional economy to flourish as if
it were a separate entity altogether -- more like a company
town than a region in Mexico or the U.S.
*Industrial Development and Urbanization
From 1910 to 1920, the population of the city of Mexicali
increased by almost 31% while that of the county rose by only
20
7.5%.7 The immense new proportions of the city, spawned
manufacturing activity for consumer goods and the construction
of several public works projects (Ladman 1975). As a
consequence of U.S. prohibition of liquor production and
consumption in 1920, brewery and gambling industries grew
prosperous in Mexicali (Ladman 1975 and Mauleon 1986).
Towards the middle of the decade, another American firm,
the Compania Industrial Jabonera del Pacifico extended its
operation into Mexicali (Ladman 1975 and Whiteford 1986).
Introducing an oil mill, soap factory, shortening plant (using
cotton by-products), and a cotton gin in connection with two
private Mexican Banks, the new firm expanded the manufacturing
base of Mexicali. By 1926, urban employment rivaled the rural
agricultural sector.
Into the 1930s, the growing manufacturing jobs in Mexicali
and the prospects of farming cotton, induced steady flows of
Mexican nationals into the region from both the interior of
Mexico and depressed areas in the U.S. On arrival, the
migrants found themselves shut out from land ownership due to
CRLC's monopolistic hold. In the city of Mexicali, CRLC also
controls much of the employment in the local cotton gin
industry and with its purchase of the Jabonera in 1931, they
further increased their economic grip on the region (Ladman
1975).
See Appendix B for exchange rates.
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The early '30s marked a period of growing tension between
landless Mexican migrants and the CRLC. Demanding the
fulfillment of post-civil war promises for land reform,
Mexican nationals pressured the state and municipal
governments to implement policies for the redistribution of
land. Region-wide uprisings of landless migrants were quelled
by local authorities who were more responsive to the American
firms than to the revolutionary ideology of national
interests. Agitated colonists subsequently turn to the
national leadership of Lazaro Cardenas' administration (1934 -
1940) for help.
B. Phase II (1935 - 1964): Nationalization of the Means of
Production
Phase II was a period of much reform beginning with land
expropriation and redistribution. The Mexican federal
government during this time, attempted to readjust the
orientation of Mexicali's agricultural sector towards central
Mexico by building rural constituencies and providing
financial assistance for crop diversification.
Nationalization of the productive resources doesn't quite
eliminate the influence of foreign capital in the Mexicali
Valley. Despite the Mexican government's efforts to integrate
the Mexicali economy into the interior markets of Mexico, the
shortage of domestic financial resources for extensive crop
diversification and agro-industry development constrains the
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development of such ties. In addition, the persistant
dominance of cotton cultivation for export leads to the
continued formation of production links with the U.S. Foreign
capital no longer has direct control over land or the ginning
companies in Mexicali but through the use of credit, they
maintain indirect control over the production of cotton.
*Land Reform
The post-revolutionary policies for land redistribution
were slow in reaching the Mexicali Valley because of its
political estrangement. Alienation resulted from the lack of
communication and transportation links between Baja California
and the Mexican federal government located in central Mexico.
Early reform leaders in Mexicali had been exiled to islands
off the Baja California coast (Ladman 1975). Not until the
Cardenas regime and the fall of world cotton prices during the
Great Depression of the 30's, did significant pressure accrue
towards the implementation of land reform in the Mexicali
Valley.
Production of cotton fell to a low of 10,800 hectares under
cultivation in 1932 from an average of over 50,000 hectares
the decade before (Ladman 1975). As profits dropped, foreign
credit sources dried up and many sharecroppers fled to the
U.S. Cardenas promised colonists government credit and the
construction of a railroad connecting the region to the
interior markets of Mexico.
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In 1936, the CRLC signed an agreement with the federal
government to sell their land to Mexican families.
Dissatisfied by the limited extent of land distribution in
1937, landless Mexican nationals, invaded foreign-owned lands
(Ladman 1975 and Whiteford 1986). This action pressured the
federal government to execute more rapidly, the expropriation
of CRLC lands and water rights. By 1946, all the land in the
Mexicali Valley was under the control of Mexican nationals
(Ladman 1975 and Whiteford 1986).
The major objective of federal government policy in the
region aimed at securing the border economy's success for
national benefit. The rapid colonization of the Mexicali
Valley by Mexican nationals was achieved by the federal
government through the provision of 20 hectare plots rather
than the 4 hectare norm of the interior. This insured not
only a rural political constituency, but also achieved the
consolidation of the means for capital accumulation into
domestic hands.
The links between central Mexico and this border region
were cemented by the federal government's assertion of its
post-revolutionary promise for land reform. Furthermore,
because no national landed elite had risen to power during
CRLC's reign, there was no manipulation of government
assistance policies in order to reconcentrate landholdings. A
peasant constituency insured the greater integration of the
Mexicali Valley into the national economy and growing
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nationalist sentiments eliminated the possibility of foreign
landowners regaining their lands.
Despite creation of the National Ejido Bank, however, there
were not sufficient resources to finance all the new farmers
in the region. The shortage of funds allowed the CRLC, via
its gins and the Jabonera, to maintain a large degree of its
economic power through the provision of credit (Ladman 1975
and Whiteford 1986). Furthermore, the CRLC still owned the
Compania de Terrenos y Aguas which managed irrigation and
water distribution in the Mexicali Valley (Whiteford 1986).
The persistence of monocrop production of cotton after the
nationalization of land, resulted primarily from the credit
relations between ejidetarios and U.S. ginning companies. In
addition, the onset of World War II in 1935 and lasting
through 1945, raised the world price of cotton as in the
period of World War I. The fortunes amassed by local farmers,
equipment dealers, and other input suppliers, bred an
agricultural bourgeoisie that was reluctant to diversify away
from cotton (Whiteford 1986). The Mexican government also
benefitted from the World War II cotton boom through the
taxation of cotton and the generation of foreign exchange.
This facilitated the further expansion and development of
Mexicali Valley's agricultural infrastructure.
25
* Exchange Policies Along the Border
The Free Trade Zone policy was introduced in 1933 but it
did not apply to Mexicali until 1937 when President Cardenas
extended it to include the entire Baja California Norte
territory (Ladman 1975, Farell 1984, and Montano 1987).
Initially, the Free Trade Zone was established as a mechanism
to improve the local economy by permitting the free flow of
imports and thereby, making living conditions attractive to
potential colonists. This zoning privilege was intended as a
temporary measure until the population of Mexicali grew to a
size that could support local manufacturing industries. Both
sides of the region benefitted greatly from the free exchange
of goods up until the end of World War II. After World War
II, the free zone policy included restrictions which protected
domestic industries.
Towards the decade of the '50s, after wartime profits had
been depleted, the federal government of Mexico began
implementing policies which protected industry and promoted
import substitution. The free zone policies no longer
permitted the free exchange of all goods but increasingly
employed tariffs, import licensing, and quotas to guide
commodity trade (Farrell, 1987). Currently, the Free Zone
allows free exchange of used machinery and raw materials and
taxes manufactured goods only on value added.
*Federal Government Aid
The resurgence of cotton during World War II established
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the Mexicali Valley as the most productive cotton region in
Mexico (Whiteford, 1986). However, increased production went
hand in hand with greater dependence on U.S. credit and
markets. By the mid 1950's, few backward linkages to internal
suppliers of fertilizer and insecticides were created as
insects and mineral depletion were not a problem at this time
(Ladman, 1975).8 Forward linkage with seed and machinery
suppliers were still controlled by U.S. creditors who were
interested not only in purchasing the Mexican fiber but of
expanding their market for agricultural inputs. During this
same period, the agricultural and ginning companies of the
Imperial Valley became greatly diversified agribusiness
systems. They spawned chemical, processing and farm implement
companies, transportation firms (truck fleets) and most
significantly, began cultivation of fresh produce and sugar
beet.
In the Mexicali Valley, over 88,087 hectares were under
cultivation by 1955, with cotton as the primary crop
(Whiteford, 1986). The following decade however, brought
events of crisis proportion to Mexicali's agricultural
economy, once again calling for the assistance of the Mexican
federal government.
8 Linkages refer to the transfer of intermediary inputs from
one industry to another. Backward linkages refer to the entire
gamut of industries which provide inputs for the production of a
specific good. Forward linkages are with those industries which
use the good for generating other products (or for producing a
processed version of the good).
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The first crisis came in 1956 with the construction of the
Glen Canyon Dam in the U.S. which decreased the flow of water
into the Mexicali Valley. Water scarcity created conflict
among Mexicali growers. THe response of the Mexican federal
government was to expropriate the Compania de Terrenos y Aguas
which managed water resources (Whiteford, 1986). The
government placed control over Mexicali's irrigation water
under the management of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Hydraulic Resources (SARH) as the Rio Colorado Irrigation
District. Water distribution was reduced to an amount
sufficient for 20 hectares causing growers with larger
holdings to lose or subdivide their land (Ladman, 1975; and
Whiteford, 1986).
The second crisis was the increasing salination of
irrigation water beginning in 1950 but culminating in 1958
when 88,000 hectares were taken out of production because of
high salt build-ups and annual losses of up to 30% of farmers
gross income (Whiteford, 1986). The peasant organizations,
the Independent Rural-workers Centers (CCI) and the National
Confederation of Rural-workers (CNC), mounted protests with
the U.S. Consulate in Mexicali and in Mexico City. The U.S.
ignored the issue until Mexican President Adolfo Lopez Mateos
raised the salinity issue into a foremost diplomatic problem.
In 1965, a temporary agreement was reached between the two
countries providing for the construction of better drainage
canals and the substitution of additional water from purer
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sources on the U.S. side.
The third blow to the cotton economy of the Mexicali Valley
came in 1967. Infestation of the pink bollworm reduced cotton
production by as much as 50% (Ladman, 1975; Farrell, 1984;
Whiteford, 1986). Pesticide applications rose from 250 pesos
per hectare in 1965 to 1,250 pesos in 1973 (Ladman, 1975).
The production of cotton in the Imperial Valley was equally
damaged but the devastation of the economic base. Never-the-
less, ginning companies who provided most of the credit to
Mexicali cotton farmers cut back operations and abandoned
their investments in the Mexican cotton industry.
The Mexican federal government responded to the cries for
help from the Cotton Producers Association. Taxes on cotton
were reduces and a price support system for substitute crops
such as wheat, were put into place. Massive amounts of capital
were provided through the opening of the Banco Ejidal and the
Banco Agropecuario in 1960. The final step which consolidated
the central governments power in the region was a
comprehensive agricultural rehabilitation program (Ladman,
1975 and Whiteford, 1986).
The program involved a complete renovation of the
irrigation system and the sinking of wells. Land was leveled
for better drainage requiring the relocation of many farming
communities. New roads were built and maintenance machinery
and equipment were purchased. The project took seven years to
complete (1969-1975), and cost $97.8 million, 35% of which
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came from the World Bank and 65% from the Mexican government
(Ladman, 1975 and Whiteford, 1986).
In addition to credit and infrastructural assistance, the
federal government through the SARH, implemented a program for
crop management. This involved incentives towards
diversification. In addition to wheat, the federal government
provided price supports for other food crops that were in high
demand in the growing urban population. Cattle raising was
also re-instituted in combination with cattle fodder crops
such as rye grass, sorghum, and alfalfa.
* Cooperatives
The the final expropriatory actions by the Mexican federal
government, severed the ties between agriculturalists and U.S.
capital and consolidated its own position through the creation
of a state-sponsored credit system'. The withdrawal of the
U.S. agribusiness firms however, also ended the supply of
agro-industrial inputs such as fertilizer and pesticides whose
use became necessary after the salination of the land and the
insect plague. Through government financing, several large
cooperatives took position in forward linked ginning of cotton
and backward linked production of agro-chemicals. By 1982,
70% of the cotton grown in the region was being processed by
cooperatives. Peasant communities established their power
9 The credit system functions under the national bank named
Banrural.
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bases on the foundations of such agricultural cooperatives and
soon the favorative federal credit policies gave rise to an
elite rural landed class.
C. Phase III (1965 - Present): Reproducing Mexican - U.S.
Linkages
The third phase of development is characterized by renewed
links between U.S. capital and production in the Mexicali
Valley. The first linkages appear with urban based
manufacturing but eventually spread into agriculture.
Linkages were renewed on the part of the Mexican federal
government mostly because population increases resulted in
growing unemployment which threatened the political stability
of the region.
*Border Industrialization Program
Migrants continued streaming into the area in search of
agricultural employment. Most were bound for the U.S. due to
the Bracero Program which allowed Mexican laborers to work in
U.S. agricultural fields during the post-war period and into
the 60s. The termination of this program in 1964, however,
stopped the influx of migrants at the Mexicali border.
The population of the Mexicali Valley swelled, creating a
landless rural class that represents the only unorganized
segment of the rural Mexicali Valley economy. State
capitalism that provided the conditions for integrating rural
producers into the political structure, has no provisions for
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landless laborers.
Mounting population pressure and pervasive unemployment
drove the federal government in conjunction with concerned
U.S. border governments, to devise the Border
Industrialization Program (BIP). This was a program of
maquiladoras (assembly plants) which was hoped would ease the
unemployment problem and relieve pressure from potential
social and political agitation by the unemployed (Whiteford
1986).
The Bank of America financed the early stages of the BIP
construction starting in 1965, thus renewing U.S. credit links
with the Mexicali Valley. These new urban-based links
connected foreign capital with an urban bourgeosie who managed
production from the Mexican side. Centered on labor
intensity, these maquiladoras employed mainly young women
migrants who were the cheapest source of labor and the least
likely to unionize.
The characteristics of maquiladora production easily
resemble the specialization of the earlier cotton producers
under control of U.S. agribusiness. All of the manufacturing
industries in the BIP are supplied with U.S. inputs (semi-
finished goods) and once assembled, the final product returns
to the parent firm in the U.S. Even the orientation of
transportation and communication networks for the BIP
industrial parks are geared towards easy access to and from,
the U.S.
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Employment growth through the BIP program has turned out to
be a short run measure. Again, its outward orientation
precludes the development of internally linked industries and
therefore is not conducive to further growth in the long run.
Into the 1980s, maquiladora employment as a share of total
manufacturing employment had dropped close to 30% from 41% in
1972, and 64% in 1967.
The development of agricultural export production linked
with U.S. capital also has its beginnings around the same
period that the BIP was instituted. The renewal of linkages
with the agricultural sector is the topic in the following
chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE EXPORT VEGETABLE SECTOR
The purpose of this chapter is to exemplify how new growth
in the Mexicali Valley is characterized by linkages with the
U.S. economy and how these connections reproduce patterns of
unequal development. Production of vegetables for export is a
relatively new enterprise in the Mexicali Valley and yet the
process of its expansion reflects a specialization based on
primary production (raw materials) and assembly stages. Such
specialization resembles the era of monocrop production of
cotton during which the Mexicali Valley served as an appendage
of the wider cotton production system of Imperial Valley
agribusiness.
A New Agricultural Enclave
A. Indicators of Change
Asparagus was the first major export vegetable crop grown
in the Mexicali Valley. In 1972, 61 hectares were planted and
by 1980, 1892 were under cultivation. For the 1988-89 season,
4000 hectares of asparagus are designated for cultivation.10
Signs that export vegetable production was becoming an
important sector in Mexicali agriculture appeared in the early
1980s. In 1980, vegetables had come to represent 2% of surface
10 Informe de Produccion Agricola. Ciclos 1970 - 1985.
Sectretaria de Agricultura Y Recursos Hidraulicos. Distrito de
Riego #14, Rio Colorado - Zona Valle Mexicali. Jefatura de
Estadistica.
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area harvested, 3% of total crop production and 10% of the
value of crop agriculture." Five years later, the vegetable
sector was occupying 4.4% of the surface harvested, accounting
for 6.5% of total crop production, and had risen to comprise
26% of the value of crop agriculture.
* Surface Area Planted and Value of Production
Although value and share of production figures are not
available at this time for the 1988-89 season, the surface
area devoted to vegetable cultivation is reported to be 42%
more than in 1985 (21090 hectares from 8951 hectares)."
Because the Mexicali Valley only has 180,000 hectares of
irrigated land (although about a third of this land is planted
twice a year), the incredible upsurge of surface area devoted
to vegetables can plausibly be expected to raise this sector's
share of 1988-89 production value even more dramatically.
Corresponding to an interview with Licenciado, Luis Vizcarra
Quinones, the Director of the Program in Meteorological and
Statistical Studies for SARH, the current level of surface
area devoted to vegetable production is upwards of 7%.
" Derived from: Informe de Produccion Agricola, Ciclos 1970
- 1985, Sectretaria de Agricultura Y Recursos Hidraulicos (SARH),
Distrito de Riego #14, Rio Colorado - Zona Valle Mexicali, Jefatura
de Estadistica, and Estadistica de Frutas y Hortalizas, Ciclos 1970
- 1985, SARH, Subdelegacion de Planeacion Programa de Estudios,
Meteorologia y Estadistica.
12 1988 report of surface planted by the Union of Regional
Agricultural Vegetable Producers (UNPH). Cycles 1987-88 and 1988-
89.
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Asparagus cultivation is an example of how small increases
in surface planted in vegetables, translates into large
increases in value. In the ten year period between 1975 and
1985, asparagus on average, took 9th place in area planted
(Figure IV-1).
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From 1975 to 1985, surface area devoted to asparagus
increased by 56% compared to a 112% increase in land devoted
to maize. The value increase for 1985s asparagus, however,
rose by 157% from 1975s while for maize, the period's increase
was only 93% (Figure IV-2).
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It is evident that in vegetable production, much less land
is needed for achieving levels of value equal, if not superior
to the eight or nine other crops that cover more area. Again,
refering to the example of asparagus, this crop goes from
being number nine out the regions ten most valuable crops in
1979 to third in 1985.
* Level of Exports
From 1982 to 1987, vegetable exports exiting through
Calexico in the Imperial Valley, have more than doubled
(Figure IV-3)." Vegetable exports must be registered with the
local Plant Sanitation agency in Mexicali in order to meet
quality standards and cross into the Imperial Valley. The
figures represented in the data correspond to amounts greater
than vegetable production levels recorded by the Mexicali
Valley Irrigation District agency (SARH).
The reasons for this difference is that neighboring farming
communities (further south and in the San Luis Rio Colorado
Valley of Sonora to the east) bring their products through
Mexicali because of its proximity to transportation links with
the Imperial Valley, San Diego, and Los Angeles, California.
The SARH estimates that close to 70% of these exports actually
represent Mexicali grown produce while the rest originate
elsewhere. The accuracy figures are difficult to asses
because Plant Sanitation does not report sites of origination,
only quantities. Mexicali export figures for crops such as
" Also see Appendix C.
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asparagus, green onions, and garlic are believed to be upwards
of 95%.
FIGURE IV-3
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* Level of Imports
Imports of vegetables into the region reflect a more
dramatic increase pattern to that of exports; increasing by
over 200% from 1982 to 1987 (Figure IV-4).'"
14 Based on a discussion with SARH's director of
Meteorological and Statistical Studies, Licenciado Luis A. Vizcarra
Quiiiones, December 1988).
IS Also see Appendix D.
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FIGURE IV-4
MEXICALI VALLEY VEGETABLE IMPORTS
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An explanation for such rapid increases of vegetable
imports may be that as export production expands, vegetables
for domestic consumption are displaced. It is logical that
U.S. agribusiness firms searching for farming partners, would
seek out the growers already established and most experienced
in vegetable cultivation. In 1986, both exports and imports
decline to rather low levels than the period before. This is a
consequence of an unusually dry year which limited production
to only one growing season than the two crop per year norm for
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vegetables."
Growing exports would explain the rising value of vegetable
production in the Mexicali Valley because export prices are
much higher than those for vegetables destined for domestic
consumption. Over all, the range of median rural prices for
vegetables are higher than those for food grains, industrial
use crops, and feed grains/grasses (Figure IV-5).
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An obvious reason explaining the growth of the vegetable
sector is its profitability (Figure IV-6). Asparagus yields
the highest profit margin among Mexicali's four most important
crops.
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The primary expense in vegetable production besides land,
is labor because the delicate nature of the crop prevents
mechanization of most production phases. Land is more or less
equivalent due to the success of the Mexican agricultural
industry in achieving levels of productivity similar to their
U.S. counterparts (Mares 1982).
Wages in 1988 for the Mexicali Valley on the other hand,
are 14% (minimum $3.75/day) of Imperial Valley wages
($26.80/day at $3.35/hour minimum wage for an 8 hour day).
Actual wages for 1988 in the vegetable sector are more like
$5.64/day in the Mexicali Valley compared to $40.00/day for an
8 hour day in the Imperial Valley.1 7 Even under actual
conditions, Mexicali Valley vegetable sector wages are still
only 14% of Imperial Valley wages. The comparative advantage
the Mexicali Valley gains by the differential in labor costs
allows it to be a major international competitor in the global
vegetable market.
B. Mexicali Vegetable Production
The extraordinary aspect of the vegetable sector's
development in the Mexicali Valley is not only its sudden
rapid expansion, but the degree of sophistication exhibited by
Mexican growers. Competing on the international market
requires cultivating produce that meets strict quality
standards; standards established by U.S. growers who, through
17 National Commission on Minimum Wages, as reported from the
Official Daily of the Federation for the years: 1978-89. Converted
to U.S. dollar equivalents (see Appendix B).
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mechanization and pest control, consistently achieve uniform
output.' 8 In a relatively short period of time, Mexicali
vegetable growers exhibit cost effectiveness in addition to
mastering quality control.
*Mexican Linkages with Imperial Valley Agribusiness
The key to Mexicali's success is found in the relationships
between Mexican producers and U.S. agribusiness interests
(primarily from the Imperial Valley). As discussed in Chapter
Three, Mexicali Valley farmers have long relied on imported
technology for their production. Mexicali's proximity to the
fourth most productive agricultural region in the U.S., the
Imperial Valley of California, positions it at the heart of
technological innovation in irrigated agriculture. The latest
machinery, seed varieties, pesticides, and other material
inputs, find their way quickly into the fields of Mexican
farmers. Duty-free zoning permits and encourages, such
technology transfers. Furthermore, the fluidity of labor that
works both sides of the border, going back an forth
corresponding to seasonal employment, transfers planting
techniques and other production skills from U.S. farms to
Mexicali farms.
The Mexicali Valley's sudden yet successful entrance into
the international vegetable market is remarkable indeed but
i8 Standards of size an appearance were introduced in the
United States fresh produce market in order to guarantee quality
to consumers and to lessen competition from cheaper imports.
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considering the porousness of the border and its neighbor's
long history in this field, it is relevant to question -- why
the delay? Skill-wise, the Mexicali Valley has long had
sufficiently knowledgeable laborers for developing a vegetable
sector because a significant portion of Imperial Valley
laborers reside in Mexicali and commute daily to work. With
respect to infrastructure, the Mexicali Valley is equally well
endowed. The regional irrigation system is well maintained
given the 1968 upgrading of the entire system. Furthermore,
the Mexicali Valley has a complete transportation system with
immediate access to U.S. networks via railway, highway, and
airport connections.
The reason for Mexicali's late arrival into the export
vegetable scene lies instead in the shortage of financial
resources necessary for constructing an internally controlled
and comprehensive vegetable commodity system."
Imperial Valley growers have specialized in truck
farming (large scale production of fresh produce) since the
late forties. Many large agribusiness corporations have
evolved around this specialty. Although labor intensive, the
large scale production of vegetables requires sizable
19 Some specialty vegetables like garlic and green onions
were grown for the local urban (Mexicali and Tijuana) market but
not at the scales observed in the current phase of production.
The current local market system would not be capable of moving such
enormous quantities of highly perishable produce. The local market
system consists mainly of the network of government administered
stores (CONASUPO) and small private markets.
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capital investments like airplane crop-dusters for spraying
pesticides, refrigerator equipped packing sheds and trucks,
transport trailers, and on site packing machines (recent
innovations). Another essential facet in the production of
vegetables is a marketing infrastructure which in the Imperial
Valley, is extensive and effectively controlled by large
agribusiness firms. This infrastructure includes distributors
and market agents who coordinate the sale of produce and
compile information on market conditions (i.e., price updates
and levels of sale).
Mexicali's introduction into the vegetable market did
not develop out of a sudden surplus of internal resources but
rather, came about through linkages with the Imperial Valley
vegetable network. With the end of the Bracero Program in
1964, cheap Mexican labor was not abundantly available for
California growers. The farm-workers union (UFW) strikes of
1978-79 also pressured California agribusiness for higher
wages. The rise of production costs on the U.S. side induced
cutbacks by local producers. As Imperial Valley farmers
decreased production of the most labor intensive crops (i.e.,
asparagus, garlic, green onions) Imperial Valley distributors
sought new sources in Mexicali for filling in the gaps.
Chapter Three establishes that the era of the 60s and 70s
was one in which Mexicali agriculture sought to diversify its
production. However, a short supply of credit from the
nationalized banking system, made room for only those crops
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which the federal government sought to promote. Wheat, maize,
and other food grains fit into the current federal policy of
basic needs production while cotton in its well established
tradition in Mexicali, was maintained as a major generator of
foreign exchange (even in its reduced state). Under these
conditions, U.S. distributors easily found producers who were
ready to supply them with vegetables in exchange for
financing.
* Mechanisms
Financial mechanisms facilitated linkages between primary
producers on the Mexican side and U.S. produce wholesalers.
Credit of course, is the main instrument but this is allocated
in several different ways.
The most comprehensive method is a binational partnership
which involves direct capital investment on the part of the
U.S. firm for the undertaking of the entire venture on the
Mexican side. This includes supplying the Mexican grower with
material inputs and machinery. The U.S. firm actually assumes
some level of risk alongside the Mexican partner. These types
of arrangements are not the norm and occur primarily among
growers from both sides, who have had a history of cooperation
or prior business encounters. Such is the case with some
Mexican ex-cotton producers who previously sold their cotton
to Imperial Valley ginning companies or other middlemen and
now grow vegetables for these same companies (or produce
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subsidiaries of the ginning companies).20 The U.S. partner
markets the produce through his own marketing agents or
distributor and splits the profit based on pre-arranged
agreements.
The other type of mechanism is the production contract.
This method is broader in scope and is found in countless
variations but basically functions as a purchasing agreement
between primary producers and market agents. A contract can
include provision of credit for start-up costs, material
inputs and labor, and a commitment to purchase the growers
output. The agreement can incorporate all of these terms or
any degree of combination.
The most popular because it involves the least amount of
risk, is the agreement to purchase the final output at harvest
time. Growers willfully accept these offers because contracts
also serve as a basis for obtaining personal loans from
private Mexican banks. In the past, high risks associated
with skyrocketing inflation and the volatility of the market
due to the perishability of the product, deterred local
production of vegetables for export. Mexican growers'
assurance of a buyer for their product now makes private
lending an option.
20 Absolute numbers of how many of these partnerships exist
is not officially recorded but interviews with Imperial Valley
marketing agents, and agricultural agencies and researchers on both
sides of the border, confirm that they occur.
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* Structure of Production
After the dust settled from the stampede of U.S. investment
flowing into the Mexicali Valley during the early eighties, it
was evident that a strong outward orientation of the vegetable
sector had resulted. The structure of production developed
within the Mexicali Valley clearly displays unbalanced growth.
The signs of imbalance are depicted in the contrast between
the vitality of cross-border vertical linkages and the
deficiency of such linkages within the internal economy of
Mexicali. This is most evident in the types of enterprises
which U.S. agribusiness firms promote and those which they do
not encourage through investment.
New producers of primary goods (fresh produce) flourish
along with owners of packing sheds while material inputs
continue to be imported from the U.S. Sometimes the use of
U.S.-made inputs are stipulated in contract clauses; other
times they are simply cheaper to import. In addition, all the
marketing is conducted on the U.S. side through U.S. marketing
agents and distributorships. The distinction between each of
the above mentioned, production phases is the differentials of
value added corresponding to each. The enterprises which are
developing in the Mexicali Valley represent stages of
production at the lower end of the value added scale while the
ones in the U.S. exemplify the highest levels of surplus
extraction.
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The resulting production structure within the Mexicali
Valley then, is characterized by an abundance of primary
producers and second stage assembly (sorting and packing), and
a relative absence of industries which supply production
inputs and distribute output to the market. Mexican vegetable
growers resemble "agro-maquiladoras" in their function of
taking U.S. inputs and producing a final product that goes
back to the parent firm (in this case the agribusiness
conglomerate) to be sold in the U.S. and abroad.2 1 A clearer
case of this activity is evidenced with carrot producers in
the Imperial Valley who bring their produce grown in the U.S.,
to have it packed in Mexicali Packing sheds. The carrots,
packaged under the Imperial Valley grower's label is then
shipped back to the U.S. side and sold there.22
Currently, Mexicali Valley vegetable production responds to
U.S. agribusiness firms and is subject to development in
accordance to U.S. needs. These needs have evolved to mean
specialization at certain stages of production and the
cultivation of strong ties of dependency towards the U.S.
commodity system. Continued specialization towards outward
orientation occurs at the expense of engendering an internal
supply and distributive network that could potentially foster
21 The term "agri-maquiladoras" was used by Licenciado Luis
Roman Callero, researcher at the Colegio de la Frontera Norte, in
a personal interview to describe the vegetable production activity
in the Mexicali Valley.
22 The Packer, Saturday November 26, 1988
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autonomous growth that competes, rather than compliments the
Imperial Valley vegetable sector.
Such an example is exemplified by the Mexican vegetable
growers in the state of Sinaloa who not only dominate the use
of productive resources but have established a strong
political voice legitimized by the Mexican federal government.
The combination of these two has propelled the Sinaloan
vegetable growers into becoming major competitors on the
international vegetable scene. The basis for federal
government participation in the growing activity of export
vegetable production in Mexico is modeled after the Sinaloan
experience.
* The Role of the Mexican State
The Mexican federal government has a tradition of
intervening in national industry through policy which
stipulates mandatory participation in producer organizations
tied to state directorships. In the case of agriculture, the
Mexican Federation of Agricultural Organizations (founded in
1932 under the administration of General Plutarco Elias
Calles) establishes the functional basis for creating local
agricultural associations within a state. The format is of a
corporatist nature allowing for control from the top down.
This way, "they are licensed by the state, limited in number,
singular, hierarchically ordered, functionally differentiated,
subject to official recognition, and given a representational
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monopoly". 23
The Union of Vegetable Producers (UNPH) is the Federacion's
vegetable branch. It was founded in 1961 in response to the
development of export vegetable production in the state of
Sinaloa and the particular needs of this production enclave.
The UNPH is responsible for carrying out five basic functions:
1) regulating horticultural production, 2) promoting vertical
integration into marketing and industrialization, 3)
coordinating and stimulating cooperative efforts, 4)
representing members before relevant public and private
agencies, and 5) providing production services.2
Regulating production is the principal duty of the UNPH.
This is accomplished through the formation of production
quotas based on estimates from market trends. These quotas
take into account production for export in addition to that
destined for the domestic markets. Regional branches of the
UNPH are required to register with the ministry of agriculture
through the local offices of the SARH in order to participate
in the formulation and apportionment of these quotas. In the
Mexicali Valley, the UNPH has 444 members. 227 of the growers
are ejidetarios and 217 are small private farmers. Members are
grouped in producer associations that range from 3-10 growers.
23 David Mares, "Agricultural Trade: Domestic Interests and
Transnational Relations" in Jorge I. Dominguez, ed. Mexico's
Political Economy: Challenges at Home and Abroad. London: Sage
Publications, 1982.
24 Ibid.
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Each branch is responsible for allocating the regional
share of production among its members. This apportionment is
never-the-less, hypothetical and mostly in the spirit of
national cooperation since neither the national nor the
regional UNPH have enforcement authority.
In fact, many of the production contracts in the Mexicali
Valley are in excess of the quota limits. 25 This is not
favorably looked upon by the national UNPH because
overproduction can place downward pressure on prices. The
argument in Mexicali is that growers are not actually
overproducing but rather, assume the U.S. associate's share of
the market and as such, are not violating national objectives.
In any case, the region has a different climate and thus
different growing seasons from other major vegetable producers
in Mexico, namely Sinaloa. Therefore, Mexicali growers
believe that their production does not compete with other
Mexican exports on the international market.26
Dissension between the Mexicali UNPH and the national group
stems from the fact that the conditions in the Mexicali Valley
are very different from those of Sinaloa from which the role
of the UNPH was derived. The early start of Sinaloan export
vegetable production (early 1900s) and the profits made from
25 Based on discussion with Martha Stamatis Maldonado,
researcher at the Autonomous University of Baja California (January
1989).
26 Ibid.
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massive exportation since the mid-50s and 1960s, finds it
today with a very extensive domestic horticultural commodity
system and a powerful rural bourgeoisie of national origin.
In Sinaloa, the concentration of vegetable production in the
hands of Mexican agri-firms permits the regional UNPH to
control production and exports, match supply with demand, and
reap oligopoly prices." In addition, the strength of the
Sinaloan UNPH translates into market power because Mexican-
owned subsidiary distributorships based in the U.S., control
over more than half of the credit provided to local producers.
Mexicali vegetable producers on the other hand, lack
financial resources of their own and have a deficient internal
vegetable commodity system. Their production of vegetables
for export is hinged on the Imperial Valley's vegetable market
network as are their credit needs. Under these conditions, it
is clear that the Mexicali Valley UNPH is relatively weak in
its ability to promote its first two assigned functions of
regulation and vertical integration. Its role for the present
is mainly one of coordinating cooperative efforts and
cultivating a political voice in Mexicali Valley agriculture.
SUMMARY
Export vegetable production in Mexicali is a direct
consequence of U.S. investment. The Mexicali vegetable sector
has been converted into an appendage of the Imperial Valley's
27 David Mares
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vegetable commodity system. Similar to what took place during
the region's monocultivation of cotton era (1910-1945), the
Mexicali Valley growers are being transformed into specialized
vegetable producers through linkages with U.S. credit sources
and the Imperial Valley vegetable network.
Evidence pointing to the growing dominance of vegetable
production for exports is: 1) the increasing surface area
devoted to vegetable, 2) the rising value of production, and
3) the accelerating level of vegetable exports. Vegetables
have come to represent the second most valuable crop in the
Mexicali Valley after cotton which ranks first in surface area
planted.
U.S. interest in developing the Mexicali Valley into a
producer of vegetables occurs for several reasons: 1) the end
of the Bracero Program in 1964 and farm-worker strikes in
California during the late 70s which drove up the cost of
labor (hence production), 2) the Free Trade Zoning of the area
which affords producers the opportunity to import material
inputs and allows U.S. firms to take out primary goods free of
duties or taxed on value added which is practically zero for
raw materials, and 3) the modernity of Mexicali Valley's
agricultural infrastructure and its strong links with the
Imperial Valley transportation system.
Specialization in the production of vegetables for export
is characterized by expansion which is limited to the most
labor intensive production phases (i.e., primary production
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and packing). Unequal development in the structure for export
vegetable production is defined in these terms.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
The state of the Mexicali Valley economy when viewed in
light of traditional economic indicators, presents a picture
of a vital economy. Its growth rates surpass that of the
state of Baja California and those of Mexico as a whole. In
agriculture, employment is decreasing while the share of
regional agricultural GDP is rising. In conventional terms,
this signifies an increase in worker productivity. Income
appears to meet if not exceed, federally set minimum wage
standards for the majority of the population as well as for
agricultural workers. However, looking at different - more
elusive criteria, such as the levels of unemployment and
underdevelopment, the degree of specialization characteristic
in export industries, and wage inequality, in relation to an
adjacent economy with whom economic linkages are strongest,
the notion of unequal development makes more sense.
In the case of export vegetable production in the Mexicali
Valley, specialization has come to mean a proliferation of new
vegetable producers and packing shed enterprises. Missing,
however, are the local (Mexicali based) industries such as
those that grow hybrid seeds, pesticides and fertilizers,
farming equipment special to vegetable production, and most
importantly, marketing and distribution sectors. The latter
components represent the highest value added stages in
vegetable production and have also come to be synonymous with
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market power.
U.S. agribusiness interests argue that this segmentation is
attributable to the "comparative advantages" of resource
endowment found in the Mexicali Valley. Cheap labor makes the
region the most efficient site for locating labor intensive
phases of production such as primary production and packaging.
Similarly, the expertise and technological know-how which
allow U.S. producers to manufacture cheap, quality farming
inputs, make U.S. imports the most cost effective choice.
This argument, however, does not explain why unequal
proportions of surplus extraction and of decision-making power
accrue to the U.S. side of the commodity system. In reality,
restructuring is taking place in commercial agriculture. U.S.
agribusiness is decentralizing production in a manner which
exploits the cost advantages of a geographic site while
maintaining centralized control over regulatory and investment
activity.
The organization of Mexicali vegetable production for
export tells of a fundamental restructuring occurring within
agribusiness multinational corporations. In a shuffle to
reorganize production strategies for the purpose of reducing
production costs, labor intensive production phases are
geographically located in regions where labor is cheap. This
has come to mean that less developed countries get linked up
to the international agricultural market at the lower end of
the value added scale of production. Agribusiness firms
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maintain control over the sale of production inputs and
marketing, thus harnessing the bulk of surplus accumulation.
For the agribusiness firm, restructuring involves the
decentralization of production but the retention of
centralized control over regulatory and investment activity.
As in the Mexicali Valley, the resulting structure is one
which assigns specific roles in the execution of specific
tasks, the manufacture of particular products, and the
performance of certain parts of production processes to
developing countries. This is part of a wider process of
unequal development under the new international division of
labor occurring between developed and less developed countries
(Frank 1969, Rama, and Stevenson 1986).
The strictly outward orientation of vegetable production in
the Mexicali Valley places the region in a precarious
position. The current levels of production cannot possibly be
sustained without U.S. markets and U.S. financial support.
Mexican credit is too scarce and parallel markets are not
sufficiently large enough (where they exist) to accommodate
the entire scope of the region's specialty vegetable
production. Never-the-less, the Mexicali Valley is an
important participant in the Imperial Valley's vegetable
commodity system and these binational relationships translate
into mutual interdependence.
Assessing the degree of transnational commitment towards
cooperation and mutual support requires further research into
57
the area of contractual arrangements. Field surveys
investigating the degree to which contractual agreements exist
and the characteristics of their terms, would be necessary
since contractual arrangements are not required to be
reported. Furthermore, an input-output analysis would greatly
clarify the precise nature of cross-border linkages. This
would allow for an assessment on the actual interdependence
existing between the two regions. Investigation into these
suggestions would explain many of the ambiguities of whether
unequal development promotes economic vitality or presents a
potential danger to the border economy of the Mexicali Valley.
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APPENDIX A
A. Demographic Characteristics
* Population Growth
As one of the most rapidly growing areas in Mexico, the
Mexicali Valley has experienced over 4350% population growth
since 1920. Compounded annually, the rate of growth for the
Mexicali Valley far exceeds that of the nation (Figure I) for
the same period and Baj-a California's rate reflects this
growth. For the Mexicali Valley, growth is most significant
in the city of Mexicali (10.6%).
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The 1980 census defines urban centers as any community with
over 15,000 inhabitants. During this period the urban
population represented 67% for the Mexicali Valley and 77% for
the state of Baja California. By 1987, urban inhabitants
constituted four fifths of the total Mexicali Valley
population.
The reasons for such great increases in population rest
mainly in the region's geographical position which establishes
it as a staging ground for migration into the United States.
Between 1970 and 1980, the census reports that 126,466 people
moved into the Mexicali Valley with the bulk of these migrants
originating from the central areas of Mexcio (Jalisco,
Michoacan, Guanajuato, Nayarit, and D.F. in order of
magnitude). Considering that 96,650 new births were also
recorded for the period in the Mexicali Valley, it is
presumable, given the 1980 population figure, that the balance
represents those who crossed over to the United States. It is
possible that some may have returned to their place of origin
but, considering that most people leave because of economic
reasons, this is not likely.
Migration has historically been the key to the region's
growth. Economic developments which have taken place over the
past 80-some years, provide additional insight as to why
people migrate to Mexicali and remain in the area instead of
crossing the border. Such developments are the topic of
Chapter 3 in which the historical development of the region is
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discussed.
*Age Distribution
In 1980, over 60% of the Mexicali Valley population is
under the age of 25. At first, this figure sounds
extraordinarily high but for a region where growth is mostly
contributed to migration, this is likely to be the norm.
People who migrate are apt to be the most mobile members of
the communities they leave. That is, landless, unmarried,
young men and women who can be spared by their families to
find wage labor in the U.S. or other urban centers in Mexico.
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B. ECONOMIC INDICATORS
* Gross Domestic Product
The GDP measuring gross value of production within a
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region, has for the Mexicali Valley, risen at rate of 4.3% a
year in real terms for the period between 1970 - 1987 (Figure
III). Compared to a pace of 4.1% for the state, the Mexicali
Valley's economy gets a superior rating for performance. GDP
per capita for the Mexicali Valley during this 17 year period
performs equally well; exhibiting a 1.7% annual increase
(compounded annually in real terms) despite a population
growth rate that exceeds that of Mexico as a whole.
The share of agricultural GDP rises steadily from 1970 to
1980; both as a percentage of national agricultural production
and as a part of Baja California's agriculture (Figure IV).
Within the regional economy of the Mexicali Valley however,
agriculture's sectoral share of GDP declines with respect to
all other industry (Figure V).
The decline of the agricultural GDP in the Mexicali Valley
is due primarily to the growth of manufacturing (mostly
assembly plants also known as "maquiladoras") during the
Border Industrialization Program (BIP) of the early 70s. Into
the 80s, the decline is due to the growing importance of
service sector employment. This phenomena can be associated
with the first major devaluation of the peso in 1976 which
created a boom for labor intensive industries (such as
services) in the Mexicali Valley.
* Labor Force Participation
The rate of labor force participation in the Mexicali
Valley is 33% of the total population (Figure VI). This
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figure may appear low at first glance but it actually represents
50% of the population which is older than 12 years of age.
Participation rates by sector of employment are not available
from the 1980 Census data.
For women, this rate incorporates 19.1% of all women residing
in the Mexicali Valley and 28.2% of all women over the age of 12
who are economically active. Likewise for men, the labor force
participation rate represents 48% of all men in residence and
71.8% of all economically active men over 12 years of age. The
bulk of female labor force participation falls within the 15-29
year old age group (55.3%) and similarly for men, 55% of
participation is found between the ages of 15 - 34.
FIGURE VI
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An explanation for the large proportion of working women
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falling in the age group of 15-29 is that employment is abundant
in the region's significantly large service, retail trade, and
maquiladora sectors. These areas are known to employ mainly
young, unmarried women. Another reason is that most women past
this age group tend to marry and become homemakers thus,
reflecting a lower participation rate for older women.
*Employment Distribution by Sector
Employment figures from the 1980 Census, (Figure VII) exhibit
a predominance in unspecified labor with 32.6% of workers
corresponding to this catagory. The census explanation is that
these people either reported a job whose description did not fit
any of the general catagories or did not specify an occupation
at all. Compared to the unspecified catagory's share of 6.8% in
the 1970 census, the overwhelming predominance of the 1980
figure, suggests a rise in informal sector employment or a need
to reclassify census employment catagories to fit a changing
economic structure.
Outside of unspecified workers, the leading employment
sector is services with 16.9% of the workforce. Agriculture,
trade, and manufacturing follow in order of importance with
13.5%, 12.2%, and 11.3% respectively. With a less degree of
importance, the sectors of construction, transportation, and
FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) account for 5.8%, 4%
and 2.4% of the workforce. At the bottom end of the scale fall
mining (which includes extraction of minerals, natural gas, and
petroleum), and the utilities industry representing less than 1%
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of total employment.
FIGURE VII
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Up until 1970, agricultural employment (Figure VIII),
increases in absolute numbers while decreasing as a share of
total regional employment. In 1980, however, absolute
employment in agriculture drops by a full thirty percent and as
a share of total employment, falls by sixty percent.
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FIGURE VIII
AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE MEXICALI VALLEY (1930 - 1980)
Employment 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
Number of Persons
Employed 9213 9568 24353 47623 32820 22974
Percentage of Total
Mexicali Valley
Employment 72.6 66.9 58.8 52.6 33.2 13.5
Note: Percentage calculated as agricultural employment/total
employment; does not account for unemployment and therefore will
overstate the employment share of agriculture.
Source: X,IX,VIII,VII,VI,V General Population Census for Baja
California (INEGI and SPP)
Low agricultural wages in the Mexicali Valley promote labor-
intensity in this sector and the increases in employment up to
1960 result partly from expanded production and partly because
cotton, the primary crop, was hand picked. Decreases after 1960
can be explaned by the diversification away from cotton and the
introduction of wheat from the Green Revolution techonology.
* Employment Distribution by Hours Worked
The 1980 census defines an employed person as anyone 12 years
of age and older that worked at least one hour in the week prior
to the census for pay, or at least 15 hours in the week in a
family business without pay, or who would have worked except
they were absent from work due to sickness, vacation, accident,
absences with or without permission, bad weather, work
stoppages, or machinery breakdown. In Mexico, under the Federal
Labor Law enacted in 1970, the normal work week is 48 hours (8
hours per day maximum).
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The breakdown of the economically active population (EAP) by
hours worked is shown in Figure IX.
FIGURE IX
ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
BY HOURS WORKED PER WEEK (1980 CENSUS)
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At the time of the census, of those who specified their hours,
over 40% worked approximately full-time and 12% worked more than
48 hours. Those who worked less than the standard work week
comprised 42% of the EAP. The difference of summing these
figures corresponds to the unemployed.
The data show a significant amount of full-time employment
but with an equal amount of part-time employment. It is not
clear why the there is such an even split among employment
lengths. Seasonal employment in agriculture may explain a
certain degree of less than full-time employment and another
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portion may be accounted for in the trade and service industries
which have a high turnover rate and part-time jobs. The large
maquiladora industry accounting for over 30% of employment in
manufacturing, may be responsible for many of the full-time
positions (Ladman 1975 and Farell 1984).
* Unemployment
The definition of an unemployed person in the 1980 General
Population Census for Baja California, is any person 12 years of
age or older who does not have a job but tried to obtain one a
week before the survey. The 1980 Census reports that 1143
economically active people are unemployed. This corresponds to
a rate of less than 1% (.007%). However, the definition of an
employed person suggests that this unemployment figure is
underestimated. It is not clear that many people classified as
employed under this system, are necessarily working at all times
throughout the year. It is doubtful that the unemployment rate
is as low as the official census figure indicates.
Evidence pointing to underestimation is found in Figure IX.
The data for hours worked reports a figure of 10,504, who worked
less than one hour during the week prior to the census. This
figure in combination with the census unemployment figure,
yields an unemployment rate of 6.8% which is more consistent
with past unemployment figures (6.3% for 1960 and 5.4% for
1970).
* Underemployment
Figure X shows that underemployment in the region is quite
significant for all workers but, especially so for women. The
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data show weekly hours worked (for the week prior to the census)
for the total labor force and by gender. Based on a full-time
equivalent of a 48 hour week, 26.6% of the total work force was
underemployed in 1980. For women this rate is much higher
accounting for almost a third (28.9%) of the working women while
men experience a 25.7% underemployment rate.
FIGURE X
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A similar format is used for estimating the regional
underemployment rate in 1970 (Ladman 1975) although, the census
data in this case, uses monthly figures by sector for the
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region. Ladman's study yields a figure of 22.6% for the total
workforce and a 28.4% rate for the agricultural sector (there
are no gender figures for this period).
The 1980 figure surpasses the 1970 estimate for the total
workforce reflecting a significant degree of under-employment in
the Mexicali Valley. Due to a change in format, 1980 sectoral
figures cannot be given. In any case, Ladman believes that his
figures underestimate true underemployment in the region because
it is not clear that people who worked full-time or more, did so
throughout the year. It is conceivable in this light, that a
weekly estimate would be similarly under-estimated.
In the case of agriculture, the seasonal nature of its
employment precludes an accurate yearly estimate. Never-the-
less, the fact that production is constrained by tight water
supplies, makes it is fair to say that the majority of workers
in this sector are not employed full-time on a year round basis.
*Wages
Minimum wages in Mexico are established by the federal office
of the National Commission of Minimum Wages based on an eight
hour day throughout 111 economic zones in the country. The
standard for individual zones is founded in what is considered
to be the necessary wage for workers (and their families) to
have the minimum acceptable level of living. An "acceptable
minimum" is determined by local price levels and customs. The
general minimum refers to unskilled labor whereas professional,
para-professional and specialized employment minimums average
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about one and half times more.
In 1980, the minimum daily wage in the Mexicali Valley was
180 pesos or $7.75 U.S. equivalents. After the drastic peso
devaluation in 1982, minimum daily wages dropped in value by
almost 40% and in 1987 fell to less than half of the 1980 figure
in terms of purchasing power in the U.S. (Figure XI). The
scarcity of local industris producing quality consumer goods
makes the ability to purchase U.S. products a fundamental
necessity in the Mexicali Valley border region, for consumers
and merchants alike.
FIGURE XI
H(ISTOY OF MEXICAN MN M14UM WAGE
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* Income
The 1980 Census does not contain figures for the median family
income nor for the total income earned by the economically
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active population. There is however, data on income brackets by
share of population in these catagories (Figure XII).
Based on the minimum wage of 180 pesos a day for 1980, the
average monthly minimum salary would be 4320.00 pesos (under
conditions of full time employment). Excluding the unspecified
category, 44% of the economically active population were earning
this minimum or below during the time of the 1980 Census.
Fifty-six percent of the population was earning above this
minimum mark despite the fact that only 12% of the economically
active were working more than 48 hours a week. This points to
the conclusion that average wages are higher than the federally
set general minimum, possibly indicating that a significant
degree of the working population is skilled or semi-skilled.
Income data for the agricultural sector show that 60% of this
workforce earns up to the monthly minimum wage. This supports
the idea that employment in agriculture continues being less
than full-time for most employees and/or of unskilled nature.
FIGURE X1i
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